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S'l'ATE.MENT OF .FACT, CORRECTIONS 
The defendant contends the road is not contiguous. 
This is contradicted by plaintiffs. The Defendant con-
teu<ls there were absolutely no other openings. Aerial 
1 
photos of government show a number of openings auc 
entrances, one being just a few feet from the northea.
1 
corner of the plaintiff property. 
The Defendants claim the blacktop in the roaL 
was 7 to 14 feet from plaintiffs. line while close exanu 
nation of Exhibits D-9 and D-19 will show that tlit 
fence from which distance was measured was as muchai 
3 feet inside the section line which was the property liut 
making the distance to the black top three feet shorter i
11 
those places. 
The Def en clan ts claimed the roadway iu front ut 
J esf)op's property was left intact, which is not true a 
one half of the roadway from the middle of the lot to tht 
east end was torn up preventing Jessops from driving 
in on the west and turning, and coming back on the road 
on the east without backing their car, which is now net 
essary. They only left about 39.6 feet of the road intact 
The Defendants contend a pile of dirt was put 
in 1960 and they scarified the old road so it was not 
passable. All of the witnesses testified that the road wa: 
usable until 1964 and there was no rebutting 
to this. 
The Plaintiffs saved a one acre piece for building 
purposes on the old road. There was enough land to put 
two lots on the north end and two on the south-all 7.1 
feet wide by 150 feet deep. 
Plaintiffs were never told of the intended closiuµ 
and no notice of abandonment was given. The 
2 
plaintiffs knew of the exact time of taking was when the 
deed from the county was presented in court. The De-
fendant Soter's Inc. had the county approve a subdivis-
ion which took the road and made it a part of the sub-
division put plaintiffs' sewer and manhole on Soter' s 
land, making the use of the facilities almost impossible. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DEFENDANT SOTER'S HAS DE-
PRIVED THE PLAINTIFFS OF THEIR 
PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF 
LAW. 
It is conceded that the county, under its police power, 
power, could deed away its rights to the property but 
that does not deprive the plaintiffs of their rights in the 
road, and the defendant Soter's Inc. took the county's 
right in the road subject to plaintiff's claim. It is clear 
that this road was a public road and had been for more 
than ten years, and the plaintiffs had a vested right in 
the road as shown by the statute previously cited, giving 
them an absolute right to the center of the road. 
The case at hand is clearly a suit against defendant 
Soter's Inc. for depriving plaintiffs of their property 
without just compensation for the two building lots on 
the south side of the road, and just compensation there-
for would clearly be the market value of the lots. 
3 
The defendants make much of the definition of tht 
words abut and abutting and we all know what abut 
means, but it does not mean that the black top has to ru
11 
to the property line to make the road an abutting roau 
but only to the place where it can reasonably be used br 
the public. On Creek Road the old road was as close t;
1 
the fence line in front of plaintiffs' property as it is t11 
all the other property from 13th East to plaintiffs' land 
a distance of approximately 11/2 miles and for the de. 
fendants to contend that every inch of the road was not 
used from the property line to the black top is carrying 
the postulate from the sublime to the rediculous. Noone 
is claiming or has claimed the strip between the blad 
top and the fence on any of the rest of the properties on 
the same side of the road. To be specific, there was never 
any showing or any claim of use of the land by am 
other person for the property between the plaintiff'\ 
line and the black top. 
The defendants make much of the fact that !ht 
previous citations used in plaintiffs brief were from con· 
demnation proceedings and they feel that we have mis· 
conceived our case. \iV e claim that the cases cited clear!) 
show that property including the specific right of acces1 
cannot be taken from a person without just compensa· 
tion being paid therefor and that practically every state 
recognizes the right of access as a separate property 
right for which the owner of the right should be com· 
pensated. 
4 
They cite the cases of Fairclough v. Salt Lake 
Count;y, 10 U.2d 417, 354 P. 2d 105 and the case ot 
Sine v. Holland, 18 U.2d 222, 418 P.2d 979, both ot 
which were mandamus cases to compel public officials 
and the county to bring condemnation proceedings 
whereby the owners of the property could be properly 
compensated for loss access and damages. The court 
very properly held that the state and its agency, the 
county, could not be compelled to bring condemnation 
proceedings against its desire the county and the state 
had not waived its immunity and could not be sued 
without consent and the cases were dismissed. The court 
holdings in each case that the state had used its police 
power reasonably. In these instances the principle that 
property cannot be taken without just compensation 
was pitted against the principle of the immunity of 
the government from suit and the court properly held 
the government was immune from suit in any case. 
\Ve point out that Judge Hansen cited the Fair-
clou,gh case and also the case of the Springville Banking 
Co. v. C. Taylor Burton, IO U.2d 100, 349 P.2d 157, 
which was also a mandamus case and is clearly disting-
uishable from the present case. This case clearly estab-
lished that no abutting property owner has a compen-
sable right in the flow of traffic. The plaintiffs are suing 
a private individual who has no immunity and one who 
doesn't have police power of the county as a protection 
for its acts and clearly is liable in damages to the plain-
tiffs for damage done for the loss of access. 
5 
The defendants also cite Utah Road Commission 
v. Hansen, 14 U .2d 305, 383 917, which case eveu 
from their own citation shows the Hansens were enhtleii 
to compensation reasonable access. In the presellt cast 
there is no access reasonable or otherwise. lu the Hau-
sen case the court held that the loss of access had al-
ready been computed in the damages when there was au 
allowance for severance which clearly amounts to pay 
ment for the loss of access. 
The defendants state that the abutter is not en-
titled to access at all points of his property but in this 
particular instance he was abutting the road and cou!J 
choose where he wanted to go on to it just as every 
other property holder along Creek Road chose the place 
where they wished to drive on to the road. 
The defendants make much of the fact that therr 
had not been a right-of-way established from plaintiff, 
land onto this road. Here the plaintiffs were letting the 
land lie idle until they wanted to build or sell to some om 
else to build. One acre with rather poor soil would not be 
profitable to farm. Under the defendants' argument. 
if a person had one half mile of property abutting tht 
road with only one gate and sold the one hundred feel 
with the gate in, the rest of the property would be land 
locked, as he hadn't established or reserved for himsell 
a way out of his land, which of course is absurd in the 
extreme. Incidentally the fence dividing the proper!) 
from the road was down and actual access could be made 
at most any point. 
6 
In consi<lering this problem it should be kept i11 
miu<l the type of road we are dealing with. This is not a 
restricted access road and there is absolutely no reasou 
why any property owner cannot go onto the road at any 
point. The road in front of plaintiff's property was 
perfectly adequate for their needs and they were en-
titlfd to use it for their 
The defendants also make much of the fact that 
access to the south on Rubidoux Road can be obtained 
hy the payment to the Happy Valley Inc. of $1500. 
plus interest for a number of years. but this is a right 
that the plaintiffs have always had and in addition they 
always had the right to the road on the north end of the 
property, which has now been taken away from them 
maki11g the north half of the property practically use-
less. It is submitted that defendants Soter's Inc. could 
use the land more judiciously in connection with the de-
\'elopment of its subdivision. 
POINT II 
Previously submitted by plaintiffs and as argued 
by the defendant is submitted without further argu-
ment. 
CONCLUSION 
It is evident from the record and briefs that the dis-
missal was premature and the court should remand the 
7 
case for further proceedings with the requirement thal 
the plaintiff be paid damages for what the loss proves 
to be and that each of the other defendants be requireo , 
to prove their claim against the other defendants. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LOTHAIRE R. RICH 
Attorney for Plaintiff & Appellant 
No. 16 East Stratford Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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